The Texas Shoot-Out under Knightian uncertainty
研究了商业伙伴纠纷中常用的德州枪战机制在奈特不确定性下的表现，发现当估值处于中间范围时，风险厌恶的分割方会如实报价，从而达成有效结果，与贝叶斯情形不同。
We investigate a widely used mechanism to resolve disputes among business partners, known as Texas Shoot-Out, under Knightian uncertainty. For a non-degenerate range of intermediate valuations, an ambiguity-averse divider truthfully reveals their valuation in equilibrium. As a consequence, the resulting outcome is efficient, in contrast to the Bayesian case. With equal shares, both agents prefer ex-ante to be the chooser and would like to avoid triggering the mechanism in the first place.