Bank-affiliated institutional investors and IPO syndicates formation
研究美国IPO中，承销团银行如何利用其关联机构投资者与主承销商建立关系，通过提供无利可图的价格支持来获取承销业务，并发现主承销商更倾向于选择那些关联机构提供价格支持的银行加入承销团。
By using institutional trading data in a sample of US IPOs, I provide evidence that IPO syndicate banks use their affiliated institutional investors to build a relationship with IPO lead underwriters and boost their underwriting business. First, I show that investment managers provide unprofitable price support in the aftermarket of IPOs in which their parent banks are non-lead syndicate members. This costly support is concentrated in cold IPOs and IPOs net sold by independent institutions. Second, I show that lead underwriters are more likely to select in the IPO syndicate the banks whose affiliated institutional investors support IPO prices. I discuss and document evidence of the incentives of underwriters and affiliated institutions that make price support emerge in equilibrium.