Aid Fragmentation and Corruption
利用阿富汗项目交付的独特数据，首次从微观层面实证分析援助碎片化对腐败的影响，发现单一捐助者能显著减少腐败，而碎片化则可能助长腐败。
Abstract Aid fragmentation—the simultaneous operation of multiple development agencies in one setting—has long raised concerns about coordination challenges and opportunities for corruption. Leveraging unique data on project delivery in Afghanistan, we present the first microlevel empirical analysis of aid fragmentation. We find that aid delivered by a single donor can significantly reduce corruption. Projects delivered under conditions of aid fragmentation, by contrast, can facilitate corruption. We find evidence for a theoretical mechanism linking infrastructure and physical goods with waste and leakage. Our results clarify the policy losses tied to fragmentation, yielding insights for combating misappropriation of aid.