Disentangling Reputation from Selection Effects in Markets with Informational Asymmetries - A Field Experiment
通过一项包含476次出租车行程的实地实验，分离了卖家自我选择与声誉效应，发现声誉效应显著而自我选择效应微弱，为信息不对称市场中的反馈机制设计提供了政策启示。
Abstract In markets with asymmetric information between sellers and buyers, feedback mechanisms are important to increase market efficiency and reduce the informational disadvantage of buyers. Feedback mechanisms might work because of self-selection of more trustworthy sellers into markets with such mechanisms or because of reputational concerns of sellers. We show in a field experiment how to disentangle self-selection from reputation effects. Based on 476 taxi rides with four different types of taxis, we find strong evidence for reputation effects, but little support for self-selection effects. We discuss policy implications of our findings.