Banks’ Market Power, Access to Finance, and Leverage
利用美国新企业代表性面板数据，研究发现本地贷款市场越集中，新企业越难获得信贷、杠杆率越低，且表现最好的企业受债务融资减少影响更严重。
Abstract How does lending-market competitiveness shape new firms’ financing? Using a unique U.S. representative panel of new firms, we document that in more concentrated local lending markets: (a) new firms are less likely to access credit; (b) new firms have lower leverage; and (c) the best-performing firms are more severely affected by reduced debt financing. We develop a contingent-claims model with monopolistically competitive banks that rationalizes these facts and shows how credit-market conditions determine loan fees and concentration. Our findings highlight banks’ market power as a channel through which the financial sector influences firms’ development and, hence, economic growth.