Contests with sequential entry and incomplete information
研究了多人不完全信息全支付拍卖形式的竞赛，选手序贯进入并观察先前对手的努力，证明了对称完美贝叶斯均衡的存在唯一性，发现后动者获得更高期望收益，且所有选手在均衡中均选择最后阶段行动。
This paper provides a general study of a contest modeled as a multiplayer incomplete‐information, all‐pay auction with sequential entry. The contest consists of multiple periods. Players arrive and exert efforts sequentially to compete for a prize. They observe the efforts made by their earlier opponents, but not those of their contemporaneous or future rivals. We establish the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) and fully characterize the equilibrium. Based on the equilibrium result, we show that a later mover always secures a larger ex ante expected payoff. Further, we endogenize the timing of moves and show that all players choose to move in the last period in the unique equilibrium that survives iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies (IESDS).