Symmetric reduced‐form voting
研究了对称环境下两候选人的投票模型，刻画了可由对称投票规则实现的中期分配概率，并证明其可表示为合格多数和合格反多数的凸组合，对投票规则设计有参考价值。
We study a model of voting with two alternatives in a symmetric environment. We characterize the interim allocation probabilities that can be implemented by a symmetric voting rule. We show that every such interim allocation probability can be implemented as a convex combination of two families of deterministic voting rules: qualified majority and qualified anti‐majority. We also provide analogous results by requiring implementation by a symmetric monotone (strategy‐proof) voting rule and by a symmetric unanimous voting rule. We apply our results to show that an ex ante Rawlsian rule is a convex combination of a pair of qualified majority rules.