Pair‐efficient reallocation of indivisible objects
研究了在严格偏好下不可分割物品的再分配问题，发现即使在配对有效规则集合中，顶级交易循环（TTC）仍是唯一满足策略证明和个体理性的规则，为TTC的应用提供了有力支持。
We revisit the classical object reallocation problem under strict preferences. When attention is constrained to the set of Pareto‐efficient rules, it is known that top trading cycles (TTC) is the only rule that is strategy‐proof and individually rational. We relax this constraint and consider pair efficiency. A rule is pair‐efficient if it never induces an allocation at which a pair of agents gain from trading their assigned objects. Remarkably, even in the larger set of pair‐efficient rules, we find that TTC is still the only rule that is strategy‐proof and individually rational. Our characterization result gives strong support to the use of TTC in object reallocation problems.