Tariffs, product standards, and national treatment at the WTO
构建了一个考虑消费外部性的寡头模型，研究关税与产品标准的政策互动，发现关税削减可能导致对外国企业的歧视性标准，而国民待遇虽消除歧视却可能推高关税，其福利合理性在关税受限时更强。
Abstract This paper develops an oligopolistic model with consumption externalities to study (i) the policy interaction between tariffs and product standards; (ii) how such interaction may affect the welfare justification of national treatment (NT) in product standards. Absent NT, tariff reductions can lead to more discriminatory standards against foreign firms. Imposing NT eliminates discrimination but can induce higher tariffs which tend to undermine efficiency. As a result, the welfare justification of NT is stronger when tariffs are constrained. These findings suggest that the World Trade Organization's success in tariff liberalization can strengthen the case for its NT‐based approach to product standards.