Torn between two debt types? The role of managerial ability in a firmʼs choice between bank loans and public debt
研究管理者能力如何影响企业在银行贷款与公开发债之间的选择，发现能力更强的管理者更倾向于使用公开发债，且这一选择与股东财富正相关、与破产风险负相关。
Motivated by the theoretical literature on firms' choice between bank loans and public debt, this paper analyzes whether more able managers choose a higher fraction of public debt. We find that firms with more able managers choose a higher level of public debt. We also find that the use of public debt by more able managers is positively associated with wealth creation for shareholders and negatively associated with bankruptcy risk. Our cross-sectional analyses suggest that this baseline relationship is conditional on a better information environment. We address endogeneity issues in multiple ways and run an extensive array of robustness checks. Overall, our findings are consistent with the prediction that managerial ability mitigates the information monopoly of banks.