Correlation‐savvy sellers
研究一个多产品垄断者利用大数据了解买家跨期估值相关性后，为何即使拥有完全承诺和完美信息，也无法实现完美价格歧视，原因在于信息外部性导致的信息租金和扭曲。
Abstract A multi‐product monopolist sells sequentially to a buyer who privately learns his valuations. Using big data, the monopolist learns the intertemporal correlation of the buyer's valuations. Perfect price discrimination is generally unattainable—even when the seller learns the correlation perfectly, has full commitment, and in the limit where the consumption good about which the buyer has ex ante private information becomes insignificant. This impossibility is due to informational externalities that require information rents for the buyer's later consumption. These rents induce upward and downward distortions, violating the generalized no distortion at the top principle of dynamic mechanism design.