Competition, coinsurance and moral hazard in banking
研究了银行存款市场竞争、资产端风险激励与银行间流动性共同保险参与意愿的相互作用，发现银行间市场对风险承担有双重影响，并提出资本要求与保证金结合可恢复特许权价值、促进合作。
This study examines the interaction between bank deposit market competition, incentives to take risks on the asset side, and willingness to participate in the interbank market for liquidity coinsurance. The interbank market in the model has two countervailing effects on risk-taking. First, it allows for more profitable long-term investment, which adds to a bank’s charter value and decreases risk-taking motives. Second, greater investment in the long-term asset also makes risk-taking potentially more profitable, thus eroding charter value. Finally, risk-taking motives also influence banks’ decisions to participate in the interbank market. We demonstrate how a combination of capital requirements and posting a surety bond can restore charter value, promote cooperation and boost economic activity. Additionally, this measure does not limit competition in generating charter value and implies lower costs than capital requirements alone.