Shareholder litigation risk and stock returns
利用美国各州逐步采纳通用需求法作为股东诉讼风险的外生冲击，研究发现该法通过后公司股票收益降低，且这种效应在财务约束强、CEO高风险偏好或收购保护弱的企业中更显著。
Abstract Examining the staggered adoption of universal demand (UD) laws as an exogenous shock to shareholder litigation risk, we show that firms have lower stock returns following that adoption in a difference‐in‐differences (DID) design and Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression. Sorting stocks into UD laws portfolios, we show that firms adopting UD laws earn lower risk‐adjusted returns than those who do not. Further, the relation between UD laws and returns is more pronounced when firms face financial constraints, CEOs engage in high risk taking, or takeover protection is low.