RAZOR‐THIN MASS ELECTIONS WITH HIGH TURNOUT
提出传统投票模型无法解释高投票率下选举结果异常接近的现象，转而将选举建模为政党动员选民的激励竞争，发现接近的选举能激发选民投票动机，且小党有动力确保选举胶着。
Abstract We argue that traditional voting models fail to fully explain the frequency of very close mass elections with high turnout. Instead, we model elections as a competition between incentive schemes to mobilize voters. We elucidate conditions under which parties might prefer close elections, as the potential to be pivotal motivates voters instead of exclusively costly incentives as in nonclose elections. We show that, under those conditions, better voter targeting results in tighter races and increased turnout. Furthermore, the smaller party often has a strong incentive to commit to strategies that ensure a close election.