Dual holdings and shareholder–creditor agency conflicts: Evidence from the syndicated loan market
研究了私募股权公司涉足杠杆贷款业务后，同时持有同一公司债务和股权如何缓解股东-债权人代理冲突，降低信贷成本，并提升私募股权公司的股权回报。
Abstract We examine implications from the expansion of private equity (PE) firms into the collateralized loan obligation (CLO) (i.e., leveraged lending) business. Due to similarities in the investment universes of CLO managers and PE firms, asset managers running both of them frequently hold debt and equity claims of the same company. Our results indicate lower credit costs for these companies through the mitigation of shareholder–creditor agency conflicts. The lower funding costs imply increased equity returns for the sponsoring PE firms. In addition, our findings suggest that PE‐affiliated CLO managers benefit from informed trading in the secondary leveraged loan market.