Bureaucratic redundancy and administrative burden: Evidence from public‐private partnerships (PPPs) in China
研究官僚冗余如何增加企业因PPP法规产生的合规成本，进而影响合同终止概率，并发现政府改革（如减少管辖层级、立法集中）可缓解此效应。
Abstract Administrative burden is experienced by both individuals and businesses when dealing with government entities. While previous literature suggests administrative burden arises from the deliberate choices of political actors, this study highlights how bureaucratic redundancies also lead to administrative burden. Using a dataset of public‐private partnerships (PPPs) in China, this study explored the influence of bureaucratic redundancy on administrative burden, in particular contractors' compliance costs caused by PPP regulations. The analysis found that bureaucratic redundancy has a positive and curvilinear relationship with compliance costs, which in turn has a positive relationship with the likelihood of PPP contract termination. These results hold even after controlling for political and economic factors. Nevertheless, such effects can be mitigated through government reforms, such as jurisdictional reduction and legislative centralization.