Who Can Tell Which Banks Will Fail?
研究了1931年德国银行挤兑事件，发现零售和非金融批发存款在倒闭和幸存银行中均下降约20%，而银行间存款几乎只从倒闭银行流出，表明银行更了解哪些同行会倒闭。
Abstract We study the run on the German banking system in 1931 to understand whether depositors anticipate which banks will fail in a major financial crisis. We find that deposits decline by around 20% during the run. There is an equal outflow of retail and nonfinancial wholesale deposits from both failing and surviving banks. In contrast, we find that interbank deposits almost exclusively decline for failing banks. Our evidence suggests that banks are better informed about which fellow banks will fail. In turn, banks being informed allows the interbank market to continue providing liquidity even during times of severe financial distress.