The timing and location of entry in growing markets: subgame perfection at work
构建动态模型分析企业进入成长市场的时机和位置选择，发现抢先进入威胁导致过早进入、位置趋中和租金耗散，并用加油站、餐馆和酒店数据验证了子博弈完美均衡的预测。
Abstract We develop and analyze a dynamic model in which firms decide when and where to enter a growing market. We do not pre‐specify the order of entry, allowing instead for the leader and follower to be determined endogenously. We characterize the subgame perfect equilibria of the dynamic game and show the times and locations of entry are governed by the threat of preemption, which leads to premature entry, less extreme locations, and the dissipation of rents. Using data on gas stations, restaurants, and hotels in isolated markets, we find results consistent with subgame perfection for gas stations and three‐star hotels.