Bank failures, capital buffers, and exposure to the housing market bubble
研究了银行对住房市场泡沫的风险敞口如何影响其倒闭概率，发现高泡沫敞口的银行在2007-2009年金融危机中违约率和倒闭率更高，且银行并未通过增加资本来管理这一风险。
Abstract We develop housing overvaluation measures that are separate from local economic conditions and show that banks with greater exposure to such overvalued markets have higher mortgage delinquency and charge‐off rates and significantly higher probabilities of failure during the 2007–2009 financial crisis even after controlling for bank characteristics. While high house prices relative to fundamentals present a greater likelihood of house price correction, we find no evidence that banks managed this risk by building capital. We also show that our overvaluation measures are important in explaining individual mortgage loan defaults and could be used to improve bank risk management.