The Role of Capital Expenditure Forecasts in Debt Contracting
研究了公司发布资本支出预测是否通过承诺不进行机会主义投资来促进债务契约签订，发现高杠杆和低信用质量公司更可能发布此类预测，且发布后贷款利差更低、投资效率更高。
This study examines whether the issuance of capital expenditure forecasts facilitates debt contracting by acting as a commitment to not engage in the expropriation of lenders through opportunistic investment activities. We find that firms with higher leverage and lower credit quality are more likely to issue capital expenditure forecasts. Furthermore, for firms that issue capital expenditure forecasts, loan spreads are lower and investment efficiency is greater, and these associations are stronger when the forecasts are more credible. We do not find similar results for earnings forecasts. When comparing the roles of capital expenditure covenant (which typically specify the upper limit of the allowed amount) with capital expenditure forecast, we find that the former reduces overinvestments and the latter reduces underinvestments. These results suggest that capital expenditure forecasts can be a commitment mechanism to reduce contracting costs with creditors.