The political economy of paternalism
研究了公民对家长制政治态度的差异，用理性选择模型解释为何经济偏好和分析能力不同的人会支持自由或家长制政权，并指出技能投资与政治结果存在反馈机制。
Abstract Some citizens place a high value on making decisions for themselves. Other citizens are happy to delegate decisions to a government agency. Such differences in political attitudes to paternalism can be explained in a strict rational-choice model with citizens’ heterogeneous tastes in the economic sphere. Citizens with more eccentric tastes and with high decision-making abilities tend to favor a libertarian regime. If majority preferences matter, heterogeneity in economic preferences and analytical abilities can also explain whether the political regime is more paternalist or more libertarian. As decision-making skills are a learnable capability, the strategic complementarity of individuals’ investments in analytical skills in the context of political regime outcomes suggests a feedback mechanism that can cause multiple expectations equilibria. Both a libertarian regime or a paternalist regime can emerge.