Austerity and elections
研究了发达国家中，选民是否惩罚实施财政紧缩的政府，发现以增税为主的紧缩会带来选举损失，尤其对主张自由市场的政党；而以削减支出为主的紧缩则对不主张小政府的政党不利，但对主张小政府的政党可能有利。
Abstract This paper revisits the conventional but unproven wisdom that voters penalize governments for adopting fiscal austerity in a sample of advanced economies. We consider the composition of the austerity package and the economic manifesto of the implementing government, and find that austerity packages consisting mostly of tax hikes have a significant electoral cost, which is larger for government parties that campaigned on a free‐market manifesto. Conversely, expenditure‐based austerity is costlier for government parties that did not run on a small‐government platform, but may be beneficial for those that did.