The Dynamics of Loan Sales and Lender Incentives
研究了贷款机构应保留多少贷款份额以及贷款销售如何影响贷款表现，通过模型分析发现最优合同要求贷款机构初始保留部分贷款并逐步出售，从而解释贷款销售后的动态。
Abstract How much of a loan should a lender retain, and how do loan sales affect loan performance? We address these questions in a model in which a lender originates loans that it can sell to investors. The lender reduces default risk through screening at origination and monitoring after origination, but is subject to moral hazard. The optimal lender-investor contract can be implemented by requiring the lender to initially retain a share of the loan that it gradually sells to investors, rationalizing loan sales after origination. The model generates novel predictions linking loan and lender characteristics to initial retention, sales dynamics, and loan performance.