A Tale of Two Intermediaries: Investment Banker-Auditor Social Ties and IPO Quality
研究发现，IPO中投资银行家与审计师的社会关系会提高双方合作概率，但导致企业报告更高的可操控应计利润、降低盈余可信度并恶化上市后业绩，而审计师则能获得更高收费和更多未来业务。
SUMMARY Firms undertaking an initial public offering (IPO) appoint investment bankers and auditors to certify information disclosed to investors. We find that social connections significantly increase the likelihood that the bankers and auditors become involved in the same IPO deal. Although some theory and evidence suggests that information transferred via social networks may enhance economic agents’ performance, other research implies that such links may admit bias into auditor judgment or impair their independence. Empirically, we find that IPO firms report higher discretionary accruals when bankers and auditors are socially connected. We also document that banker-auditor social ties are associated with lower earnings credibility and worse post-IPO performance. However, auditors benefit from social connections with bankers by attracting higher fee premiums and securing more future IPO audit businesses.