The role of market discipline and macroprudential policies in achieving bank stability
研究了强制银行持有次级债并加强市场纪律能否提升资本宏观审慎政策降低风险的效果，发现次级债水平越高，银行越能避免道德风险，从而增强政策有效性。
Abstract This study examines whether forcing banks to hold subordinated debt and enforcing market discipline could enhance the effectiveness of capital macroprudential policies in reducing banks' risk and contribute to bank stability. Using the system generalised method of moments and based on a sample of 322 banks across 18 countries during the period 2006–2020, we find that a higher level of subordinated debt leads banks to avoid moral‐hazard behaviours and engage in risk shifting when adapting to a tighter macroprudential framework, which in turn leads to a greater effectiveness of these policies. Furthermore, as robustness tests, we show that this effect is stronger in advanced economies and in the United States of America. These results also stand using a different proxy for banks' risk.