The Complementarity and Substitution Effects of CSR‐Focused Governance Mechanisms on CSR Decoupling
研究了英国公司中企业社会责任委员会、独立报告和契约三种治理机制如何相互配合或替代，以减少企业社会责任报告与实际表现脱钩的问题，对投资者和监管者都有参考价值。
ABSTRACT Research Question/Issue The study examines whether CSR‐focused governance mechanisms (CSR committees, standalone CSR reports, and CSR contracting) operate as complements or substitutes for each other in mitigating CSR decoupling. Research Findings/Insights The study finds that CSR‐focused governance mechanisms diminish CSR decoupling and enhance CSR credibility in UK firms. In addition, the simultaneous presence of CSR committees and standalone CSR reports has a complementary effect in mitigating CSR decoupling. Conversely, the combinations of CSR committees and CSR contracting as well as standalone CSR reports and CSR contracting exhibit a substitute relationship. These impacts remain consistent when categorizing CSR decoupling into underreporting and overreporting. During the financial crisis of 2008–2009, the complementary relationship between CSR committees and CSR reports remained consistent, although the substitution between CSR committees and CSR contracting, and CSR reports and CSR contracting, is only observed after the crisis. Theoretical/Academic Implications The study innovatively contributes to the agency theory literature by adopting a bundle corporate governance approach while focusing on specific CSR governance mechanisms to address agency issues. It empirically shows that complementary combinations of CSR‐focused governance mechanisms signify a marginal benefit in reducing CSR decoupling, leading to a reduction in agency costs. Practitioner/Policy Implications The study offers several implications. First, it helps firms create ideal combinations of different CSR‐focused governance mechanisms that provide superior marginal benefits. Second, firms' stakeholders, especially the investors, could identify the usefulness of adopting CSR‐focused governance mechanisms in CSR reporting. Finally, it could also attract regulators' attention toward the weaker aspects of the existing corporate governance code regarding CSR.