Incentivizing Tacit Knowledge Sharing in Competitive and Heterogeneous Environments
研究了企业如何设计最优激励机制促进隐性知识共享，考虑竞争和成员能力差异，发现高平均能力时可忽略能力差异，竞争加剧需增加激励，异质环境下采用混合激励策略。
Organizations, recognizing tacit knowledge as a key driver of innovation, often create incentives to foster its sharing among members, especially in competitive environments. The challenge lies in the diverse nature of this tacit knowledge and members’ varying capabilities, which complicates the design of effective incentives. Acknowledging that innovation value stems from both tacit knowledge and the dynamic efforts of involved parties, we investigate the optimal incentive mechanisms to facilitate the dissemination of tacit knowledge through a differential game model. This model takes into account the influences of competition and member diversity. Our analysis contrasts two incentive approaches to determine the superior strategy under different conditions. The findings suggest that when members’ average capability is high, the variance in their capacities can be overlooked in designing incentives. Additionally, in heterogeneous settings, organizations tailor incentives to members’ abilities. Our results also indicate that heightened competition diminishes members’ effort levels and those of the organization, while necessitating increased incentivization. Intriguingly, we discover that organizations adopt a mixed incentive approach when accounting for member heterogeneity.