Managerial focus and investment efficiency: Evidence from spin‐offs
研究了企业分拆前后投资效率的变化，发现母子公司管理层分离时投资效率保持稳定，而管理层重叠时效率显著下降，尤其当两者行业不同且地理距离较远时。
Abstract We explore investment efficiency before and after a spin‐off to assess whether post‐spinoff managerial structure helps maintain investment efficiency. Our findings reveal that the investment efficiency of parent firms remains significant when there is a clear separation of management between the parent and spun‐off firms. However, a considerable decline in efficiency is observed after the spin‐off in cases where there is overlapping management. This decrease in efficiency is particularly pronounced when the parent and spun‐off firms operate in different industries and are geographically distant from each other. Furthermore, we show that inefficient alignment of incentives for the overlapped management exacerbates this decline in investment efficiency.