Firm‐level political risk and bank loan contracting
研究发现企业层面的政治风险会提高银行贷款成本，尤其对经营不确定性高、违约风险大的企业影响更强，同时导致更不利的非价格贷款条款。政治关联和关系借贷能缓解这种不利影响。
Abstract We investigate the impact of firm‐level political risk on loan contracting. We find that firm‐level political risk is positively associated with bank loan cost and that this effect is stronger for firms experiencing increased operational uncertainty and higher default risks. Firm‐level political risk also leads to more unfavorable non‐pricing loan terms. To alleviate endogeneity concerns, we use an instrumental variable approach and placebo tests. We further find that political connections and relationship‐based borrowing can attenuate the adverse effect of firm‐level political risk on loan contracting.