The impacts of federal judge ideology on auditor litigation risk and auditor behavior
研究发现，客户公司所在辖区由自由派法官主导时，审计师更易被起诉且赔偿金额更高，客户公司更可能收到持续经营意见并支付更高审计费，但审计质量不受影响。
Abstract In this paper, we investigate whether federal judge ideology, ceteris paribus, affects auditor litigation risk and auditor behavior. We find that auditors whose client firms are in jurisdictions dominated by liberal judges are more likely to be sued and make higher payouts to plaintiffs when sued. Furthermore, these client firms are more likely to receive going‐concern opinions and pay higher audit fees. Finally, we find no evidence that the quality of audited financial statements is affected by judge ideology. The evidence documented in this paper indicates that federal judge ideology affects auditor litigation risk and some aspects of auditor behavior.