CEO Incentives for Risk-Taking and Compensation Duration
研究发现，当CEO已有的薪酬对股价波动敏感度（vega）较高时，董事会会延长新授予股权的期限，以平衡风险激励；在左尾风险较大时这一效应更强，并通过外生冲击验证了因果关系。
ABSTRACT When determining new equity grants, corporate boards face a tradeoff between the CEO’s incentives generated from the grant’s duration versus those arising from the convexity of the embedded equity risk. We hypothesize and find that boards lengthen the horizon of new compensation grants in the presence of greater pre-existing compensation sensitivity to stock return volatility (vega). In addition, consistent with our hypothesis, we find stronger results in the presence of greater left-tail risk. Further, employing two exogenous shocks to left-tail risk, we provide evidence consistent with our hypothesis that grant horizons are related to risk incentives. Our analysis of the interaction of these two incentive mechanisms provides new insights on compensation contracting. JEL Classifications: J33; M52.