Procuring Survival*
利用意大利企业数据，通过断点回归发现，赢得政府采购合同的企业比边缘失败者更可能存活，且这种生存优势超过合同期限，主要源于收益替代而非规模扩张，同时缓解了信用约束。
We investigate the impact of public procurement on business survival. Using Italy as a laboratory, we construct a large‐scale dataset of firms—covering balance‐sheet, income‐statement, and administrative records—and match it with public contract data. Employing a regression discontinuity design for close‐call auctions, we find that winners are more likely to stay in the market than marginal losers after the award and that the boost in survival chances lasts longer than the contract duration. We document that this effect is associated with earnings substitution rather than increased business scale and that survivors experience no productivity premium. Securing contracts relaxes credit constraints and acts as a mechanism for survival.