Deposit insurance, bank regulation, and narrow banking
构建模型分析银行面临的三种摩擦，发现存款保险不会导致低效率，而资本要求和杠杆要求反而降低福利；狭义银行仅在传统银行监管低效时可行，且从未改善福利。
Narrow banking has surfaced frequently as a proposed framework for dealing with financial instability and inefficiency. Recent proposals include reforms intended to improve the implementation of monetary policy, and to deal with perceived problems related to stablecoins. A model is constructed in which banks must deal with three frictions: limited commitment, moral hazard with respect to risky assets, and potential misrepresentation of safe assets. Surprisingly, deposit insurance does not engender inefficiency, and government-imposed capital requirements and leverage requirements serve to reduce welfare. The viability of narrow banking depends on inefficient regulation in conventional banking, and narrow banking is never welfare-improving.