Reputational Bargaining with External Resolution Opportunities
研究两方在存在外部解决机会（如法院、仲裁或战争）时如何谈判，分析有理由方和无理由方的策略，发现外部机会可能对无理由方有利或有害，并在特定条件下修改了经典讨价还价解。
Abstract Two parties negotiate in the presence of external resolution opportunities (e.g. court, arbitration, or war). The outcome of external resolution depends on the privately held justifiability/strength of their claims. A justified party issues an ultimatum for resolution whenever possible, but an unjustified party strategically bluffs with an ultimatum to establish a reputation for being justified. We show that the availability of external resolution opportunities can benefit or hurt an unjustified party in equilibrium. When the chances of being justified become negligible, agreement is immediate and efficient; and if the set of justifiable demands is rich, our solution modifies the Nash–Rubinstein bargaining solution of Abreu and Gul ((2000), Econometrica, 68, 85–117) in a simple way.