Setbacks, Shutdowns, and Overruns
研究了项目执行中遭遇无限次挫折时的最优管理方案，承包商可能通过谎报挫折或延迟报告来掩盖偷懒，赞助商通过软截止日期和奖励机制激励诚实工作，但后期挫折可能导致项目反复延期甚至取消。
We investigate optimal project management in a setting plagued by an indefinite number of setbacks that are discovered en route to project completion. The contractor can cover up delays in progress due to shirking either by making false claims of setbacks or by postponing the reports of real ones. The sponsor optimally induces work and honest reporting via a soft deadline and a reward for completion that specifies a bonus for early delivery. Late‐stage setbacks trigger randomization between minimally feasible project extension and (inefficient) cancellation. Because extensions may be granted repeatedly, arbitrarily large overruns in schedule and budget are possible after which the project may still be canceled.