Endogenous Information and Simplifying Insurance Choice
研究消费者在复杂保险产品中如何主动获取信息，发现当错误选择的后果更严重时，人们会花更多精力了解产品。基于理性疏忽模型估计需求，评估简化选择（如减少计划数量、设置自付费用上限）对福利的影响。
In markets with complicated products, individuals may choose how much time and effort to spend understanding and comparing alternatives. Focusing on insurance choice, we find evidence consistent with individuals acquiring more information when there are larger consequences from making an uninformed choice. Building on the rational inattention literature, we develop and estimate a parsimonious demand model in which individuals choose how much to research difficult‐to‐observe characteristics. We use our estimates to evaluate policies that simplify choice. Reducing the number of plans can raise welfare through improved choice as well as savings in information costs. Capping out‐of‐pocket costs generates larger welfare gains than standard models. The empirical model can be applied to other settings to examine the regulation of complex products.