Market Power and the Transmission of Loan Subsidies
研究巴西大规模贷款补贴计划，发现拥有市场势力的银行通过交叉定价策略，提高其他产品价格来截留部分补贴，对信贷市场政策设计有重要启示。
Abstract We study a large-scale Brazilian loan subsidy program to expand long-term credit. The government subsidizes banks’ funding costs for lenders, who then allocate credit to firms at regulated interest rates below a maximum ceiling. We propose and test a mechanism allowing banks to circumvent the rate caps and capture part of the subsidy. We show that when issuing a subsidized loan, lenders with market power use a cross-product pricing strategy, whereby they increase the price of other products to the same client. Our results have important policy implications for the design and effectiveness of government interventions in credit markets.