On the limit points of an infinitely repeated rational expectations equilibrium
研究了重复经济中理性预期均衡的极限性质，证明在重复互动中代理人最终会达到对称信息且帕累托有效的均衡，并给出反向构造。
Abstract We study the rational expectations equilibrium (REE) in the framework of a repeated economy. In each repetition agents observe the sequence of asymmetric REE’s occurred in the past to update their private information. We show that, in the limit, agents reach a symmetric information REE which exists universally (and not generically) and it is Pareto efficient and obviously incentive compatible. We also prove the converse result, i.e., given a symmetric information REE, we can construct a sequence of approximate asymmetric REE allocations that converges to the symmetric information REE. In view of the above results, the symmetric information REE provides a rationalization for the asymmetric one.