Money and Banking with Reserves and CBDC
分析了零售央行数字货币和准备金在银行拥有存款市场势力且流动性转换产生外部性时的作用，发现央行数字货币通常比存款更高效地提供流动性，最优支付中其份额往往超过存款。
ABSTRACT We analyze the role of retail central bank digital currency (CBDC) and reserves when banks exert deposit market power and liquidity transformation entails externalities. Optimal monetary architecture minimizes the social costs of liquidity provision, and optimal monetary policy follows modified Friedman rules. Interest rates on reserves and CBDC should differ. Calibrations robustly suggest that CBDC provides liquidity more efficiently than deposits unless the central bank must refinance banks and this is very costly. Accordingly, the optimal share of CBDC in payments tends to exceed that of deposits.