The private management of plant disease epidemics: infection levels and social inefficiencies
研究了李痘病毒在果树上的私人管理问题，分析了不同初始感染水平下农场间的博弈如何导致社会无效率，并探讨了补贴方案的政策含义。
Abstract Plant disease control is often implemented at the private property level, and problems of cooperation and coordination between landowners can lead to social inefficiencies. Drawing on the private management problem of sharka on Prunus trees, we analyse an epidemic game and its outcomes according to initial infection levels. We show that, depending on the infection level in each farm, the nature of strategic interactions changes drastically, and a wide range of games can occur, including games with multiple or without pure strategy equilibria and games with coordination or anti-coordination patterns. We characterise the epidemic conditions for which private management produces social inefficiency and analyse the properties of uniform and differentiated subsidy schemes to solve it. We conclude with a discussion of the policy implications of the ongoing deregulation of sharka management in France.