Take-up and labor supply responses to disability insurance earnings limits
研究了匈牙利降低残疾保险收入上限后，该政策对参保者筛选和劳动供给的影响，发现收入上限降低虽轻微改变参保人群构成，但显著减少了在职受益人的劳动供给，表明收入门槛应提高。
In most disability insurance programs beneficiaries lose some or all of their benefits if they earn above an earnings threshold. While intended to screen out applicants with high remaining working capacity, earnings limits can also distort the labor supply of beneficiaries. We use a reduction in the earnings limit in Hungary to evaluate this trade-off and examine screening and labor supply responses. We find that the policy changed selection into the program modestly but reduced labor supply on the intensive margin significantly. These findings suggest that the earnings threshold should be higher.