The threat of voiced shareholder disapproval and the value of voting
研究发现，当股东获得对薪酬计划的咨询投票权后，投票溢价下降，因为股东通过提前谈判获得让步，减少了对投票权的需求；让步还涉及投资、分红和独立董事，相关公司随后一年有正超额收益。
Abstract We study how granting shareholders an advisory compensation vote affects the subsequent demand for shareholder voting rights. We find that the voting premium decreases when shareholders are given the right to disapprove firm compensation plans, consistent with shareholders preemptively negotiating concessions, which results in a diminished need to use their votes. Potential concessions extend beyond compensation; firms that experience a decrease in voting premiums also experience changes to investment and dividend policy, as well as the number of independent directors. The same firms experience positive abnormal stock returns over the following year.