Inside and Outside Information
研究了监管者如何设计测试来揭示企业质量的外部信息，同时企业可披露可验证的内部信息，发现最优测试应促使内部人保持沉默，并为银行压力测试和信用评级设计提供指导。
ABSTRACT We study an economy with financial frictions in which a regulator designs a test that reveals outside information about a firm's quality to investors. The firm can also disclose verifiable inside information about its quality. We show that the regulator optimally aims for “public speech and private silence,” which is achieved with tests that give insiders an incentive to stay quiet. We fully characterize optimal tests by developing tools for Bayesian persuasion with incentive constraints, and use these results to derive novel guidance for the design of bank stress tests, as well as benchmarks for socially optimal corporate credit ratings.