Price customization and targeting in matching markets
研究平台在匹配市场中如何通过定制价格实现利润最大化，并分析统一定价（如隐私法规导致）对目标定位和社会福利的影响，适用于广告交易、在线零售和媒体市场。
Abstract We introduce a model of (platform‐mediated) many‐to‐many matching in which agents' preferences are both vertically and horizontally differentiated. We first show how the model can be used to derive the profit‐maximizing matching plans under customized pricing. We then investigate the implications for targeting and welfare of uniform pricing (be it explicitly mandated or induced by privacy regulation), preventing the platform from conditioning prices on agents' profiles. The model can be applied to study ad exchanges, online retailing, and media markets.