Distracted institutional shareholders and debt maturity
研究发现机构股东分心会导致企业债务期限延长，在信息不对称或财务约束高的公司中更明显，且分心时企业会持有更多现金进行价值破坏的收购，支持代理问题假说。
Abstract We examine whether institutional shareholders’ distraction affects corporate debt maturity decisions. We find that firms with distracted shareholders are associated with lengthened debt maturity. The effect becomes stronger for firms with high information asymmetry or those with high levels of financial constraint. When distraction is high and debt maturity is low, firms hold more cash and use that cash in value‐destroying acquisitions. This supports the prevalence of agency problems when institutional shareholders are distracted. The impact of distraction is persistent and affects the debt maturity decision in the future. Our findings are robust to endogeneity and other concerns.