Experts and arbitration outcomes: Insights from public procurement contract disputes
通过分析意大利公共采购合同纠纷，研究发现使用专家会减缓案件解决速度，但对纠纷结果或仲裁小组一致决策的不确定性没有影响，为争议解决机制设计提供参考。
Abstract We explore the use of experts in arbitration proceedings by analysing public procurement contract disputes in Italy. Balancing cost with accuracy, participants to a contract select arbitration when speedy dispute resolution is valued highly. Alternative dispute resolution mechanisms tend to give appointed arbitrators discretion in how to proceed. Consequently, principal‐agent problems can arise. Using an inverse‐probability‐weighted approach, we show that the use of an expert causes a slowing down of the case resolution, without having an effect on the outcome of the dispute nor resolving uncertainty as measured by unanimous decisions by the panel of arbitrators. Conflict resolution mechanism designers should consider the alignment of incentives between the disputants and the service providers.