Tax competition effects of a minimum tax rate: Empirical evidence from German municipalities
研究了德国一项联邦法律要求未受监管的市政当局对企业利润设定最低税率的效果，发现多数市政当局未改变税收政策，只有高税率市政当局降低了税率但税收收入未下降。
This paper explores the effects of a federal law that obligates previously unregulated municipalities in Germany to set a minimum tax rate on firms’ taxable profits. In particular, we examine the tax-policy response of municipalities that compete locally with “tax-haven municipalities”, i.e.municipalities that originally have set lower and, in some cases, even zero tax rates. The analysis distinguishes treated and not-treated municipalities based on their distance to a tax-haven. Our results show that the majority of municipalities do not change their tax policy. Apart from the tax-havens, only high-tax municipalities show a response – they reduce the business tax rate without experiencing a decline in tax revenues.