Can managers successfully deceive investors? Media attention and market manipulation during the Panama scandal
研究了1888年巴拿马公司经理在法国报纸散布虚假利好消息以吸引投资者认购新证券，发现新闻仅增加股价波动而不影响预期收益，且未来新闻对当前收益有非同期正向影响，暗示内幕交易。
Abstract This paper explores how the Panama Company stock price incorporated fake positive news planted by company managers in French newspapers during the spring of 1888 to bait investors into an upcoming securities issue. The results show that news about the Panama Company only had firm-specific effects, making the firm’s main stock more volatile while keeping constant expected returns. This suggests that investors considered the new debt issue a risky operation. Finally, we find a non-contemporaneous positive effect of future news on present stock returns, suggesting an unlawful exploitation of asymmetric information by investors privy to the publication of fake news.