Contacts, altruism and competing externalities
研究了部分利他个体在无症状感染下的自愿接触行为，区分了偶然接触和必要接触两种外部性，发现利他主义对疾病传播的影响取决于接触类型，为疫情管理政策提供了差异化建议。
This paper considers voluntary transmissive contacts between partially altruistic individuals in the presence of asymptomatic infection. Two different types of externalities from contacts are considered, infection externalities and socioeconomic externalities. When contacts are incidental, then externalities work through disease propagation. When contacts are essential, both infection and socioeconomic externalities are present. It is shown that for incidental contacts, equilibrium involves suboptimally high exposure whereas for essential contacts, equilibrium exposure is suboptimally low. An increase in altruism may thus increase or decrease disease transmission, depending on the type of contact under consideration. The analysis implies that policy to manage an epidemic should differentiate between different types of transmissive activities.