Cash versus Share Payouts in Relative Performance Plans
研究了相对绩效评估激励计划中现金支付与股票支付对管理者风险承担行为的不同影响，发现股票计划会削弱管理者追求特有风险项目的动机，对薪酬设计者和公司治理研究者有参考价值。
ABSTRACT This study examines the risk taking properties associated with incentive plans that use relative performance evaluation, with a focus on the form of payout, whether in cash or shares. By analyzing determinants and consequences of payout form choice, I find that share-based plans offer risk-averse managers weaker incentives to pursue projects with idiosyncratic risk compared with cash plans. This occurs because share plans—unlike cash plans—expose managers to systematic performance trends, as payout values are linked to stock prices. Additionally, I document that the variation in risk taking incentives depends on expected relative performance and the strength of the incentives. Overall, this study’s findings suggest that commonly used share-based relative performance plans might not always motivate managers to pursue innovative projects with high idiosyncratic risk when projects with systematic risk are available. Data Availability: All data are available from the sources identified in the text. JEL Classifications: G30; J33; J41; M12; M41.